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Abstract  
Tobacco industry public relations campaigns have played a key role in challenges to 
standardised cigarette packaging. This paper presents a comparative analysis of industry 
campaigns in Australia and the United Kingdom, which have implemented standardised 
packaging legislation; Canada, where policy has been adopted but not yet implemented; and 
the Netherlands, which has considered, but not enacted regulation.  Campaigns were 
identified via Google searches, tobacco industry websites, media coverage, government 
submissions and previous research; analysis focused on issue framing and supporting 
evidence. Public relations campaigns in all case study countries drew on similar frames - 
the illicit trade in tobacco products, the encroaching Ônanny stateÕ, lack of evidence for the 
effectiveness of standardised packaging, a slippery slope of regulation, and inherent threats to 
intellectual property rights. These claims were supported by industry research, front groups 
and commissioned reports by accountancy firms, but were not with verifiable research. 
Independent evidence that contradicted industry positions was overlooked.  Similarities in 
structure and content of public relations campaigns in countries that have enacted or 
considered regulation points to a strategic co-ordinated approach by cigarette manufacturers. 
Countries considering standardised packaging policy can expect powerful opposition from 
the tobacco industry. Tobacco control communities and policy makers can learn from 
previous experience, and share best practise in countering industry arguments.    
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Introduction 
In 2008, the Framework Convention on Tobacco ControlÕs (FCTC) Conference of the Parties 
urged member countries to adopt standardised (or ÔplainÕ) packaging of tobacco products that 
restricted or prohibited logos, colours, brand images and other promotional material, leaving 
only brand names in a standard colour and font style and large health warnings [1]. The 
recommendation was based on experimental studies undertaken in Australia, the United 
Kingdom (UK), the United Stated (US) and other countries [2] that indicated that restricting 
all but the most basic identifying information on packaging would reduce the appeal of 
cigarettes, the capacity of packaging to misrepresent the harms of smoking, and increase the 
visibility and effectiveness of health warnings.  
 
The value of packaging in differentiating brands and the importance of design and colour in 
creating brand identity and consumer loyalty is emphasised in marketing literature [3]. 
Analysis of previously confidential tobacco industry documents demonstrates tobacco 
industry awareness of the importance of packaging in communicating with consumers, and 
significant investment into research on pack size, shape, colour and designs that attract 
consumers and establish brand loyalty [4-6]. Standardised packaging legislation poses an 
explicit threat to industry promotional strategies by removing a key medium, particularly in 
markets where other forms of advertising are restricted.  
 
Australia became the first country to require standardised packaging in 2011[7], and 
legislation has since come into force in France, the UK, Norway, New Zealand and Ireland, 
while Hungary, and Slovenia have set implementation dates. In May 2018, the Canadian bill 
introducing standardised packaging received royal assent, and a number of other countries  
have taken formal steps to enact similar regulations [8]. Existing analyses of standardised 
packaging processes has focused on policy development [7], potential as a tobacco control 
measure [9 -10] and on tobacco industry opposition to proposals for legislation which has 
demonstrated coordinated and highly integrated strategies to oppose such policies that have 
included legal challenges, public relations campaigns and political lobbying [11], 
involvement of allied organisations [12] and commissioning of research [13]. The messages 
of these campaigns have been that packaging guidelines breach intellectual property rights 
(IPR), violate international trade agreements, and establish an unwelcome precedent that 
could affect other industries [3]. These assertions underpinned tobacco industry legal 
challenges [14]; complaints under bilateral trade and investment agreements and disputes at 
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the World Trade Organization (WTO) [15-16]; and efforts to influence and obstruct the 
policy processes in countries contemplating standardised packaging [17]. 
 
This paper focuses on one element of industry response to standardised packaging - the 
public relations (PR) campaigns implemented by transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) to 
challenge proposed legislation. We use Grunig and HuntÕs widely-cited definition of PR as 
the production of content and management of communication between an organisation and its 
publics to shape perceptions of policy issues and governmental responses [18]. Recent studies 
of such TTC campaigns in the UK [19], New Zealand [20] and Australia [3] found that 
industry arguments frequently misrepresented the intent of standardised packaging or made 
vague claims regarding negative impacts of proposed legislation, and that supporting 
evidence for industry positions was irrelevant or of poor quality.   
 
The paper builds on previous studies by taking a comparative approach to analysing tobacco 
industry PR campaigns across countries that have introduced standardised packaging 
legislation (Australia, and the UK); have very recently passed legislation (Canada); or have 
considered such policy but have not enacted related measures at this point (the Netherlands). 
Identification and analysis of how the industry has framed key issues, and the evidence 
employed across multiple campaigns provides insights that will be useful for public health 
communities in countries that are seeking to enact standardised packaging legislation. Our 
analysis also contributes to existing knowledge of the ongoing efforts by the tobacco industry 
to influence the policy-making process more broadly, and underlines the relevance of 
applying frame analysis (defined below) to health policy debates [21]. It adds to existing 
literature on the tobacco industryÕs Ôthink global - act localÕ approach to adapting global 
political and market strategies to local markets and policy contexts [22]. Finally, it highlights 
the Ôregulatory chillÕ that can be created by industry challenges to policy proposals such as 
standardised packaging [15, 23] that may delay or dissuade countries from implementing 
policies in line with FCTC recommendations. 
 
Materials and methods  
Four countries were selected as   cases representative of a continuum of implementation, 
ranging from full enactment (Australia and UK), to planned (Canada), to rejected 
(Netherlands). These countries are comparable as high income democratic states, with similar 
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opportunities for corporations to engage in public relations campaigns facilitated by press 
freedom, access to populations through various media channels, and open economic systems.  
 
Public relations campaigns were identified purposively via a range of sources including 
Google searches using tobacco company names and search terms Ôplain packagingÕ and 
Ôstandardized/standardised packagingÕ. Further searchers were conducted of tobacco industry 
websites, government submissions and previous research on standardised packaging 
procedures in each country. Collection of media reports using Factiva covered the period 
from first announcement of government intention to enact legislation until its passage in each 
country.  Searches were conducted for PR campaigns initiated since April 2010, when 
Australia announced plans to implement standardised packaging. As some campaign sources 
mentioned in the media and secondary literature are no longer currently available (i.e. 
websites no longer active) we used the waybackmachine (http://archive.org/web/) to search 
internet archives, as well as archives compiled by Tobacco Tactics (tobaccotactics.org) and 
the Coalition Qubcoise pour le Contrle du Tabac 
(www.cqct.qc.ca/documents/documents.asp).  
 
Analysis adapted methods used by Hatchard et al [19] and Waa et al [20] in previous studies 
of industry strategies in the UK and New Zealand respectively. For each case study we 
situated campaigns within their political context, considered which channels (press releases, 
broadcast, print, social media, website content, etc.) were used, by whom (tobacco 
companies, front groups, others, etc.), how each campaign framed standardised packaging 
and what evidence was used to support this framing.   
 
Frame analysis refers to ways in which issues are presented, defined and interpreted so as to 
promote closure and discourage consideration of an issue outside the parameters of the 
frames employed [24-25]. The concept of framing Òoffers a more dynamic and potentially 
politically aware engagementÓ that explores the framing not only of a policy issue, but also of 
relations among policy actors and of the policy-making process itself [21]. Previous analyses 
have found that the tobacco industry frequently frames unfavourable legislation and other 
issues relevant to its operations in ways that portray the industry as the protector of individual 
rights while simultaneously framing public health initiatives as overbearing and extremist 
[26-27]. Research has demonstrated that in the case of standardised packaging strategies, 
tobacco industry campaigns have applied the following frames: a threat to intellectual 
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property rights (IPR); lacking credible evidence; restricting individual choice and freedoms 
precipitating the growth of a creeping Ônanny stateÕ; creating a slippery slope toward further 
legislative restriction; harmful to small business; and likely to contribute to increases in the 
illicit trade [3, 28-29].  
 
We assessed whether frames used were supported with evidence by determining what 
sources, if any, were used, and the quality of this evidence. Quality was assessed by applying 
Hatchard et alÕs [19] approach, based on previous analyses of (quality of) evidence used by 
the tobacco industry opposition to unfavourable regulation. Key criteria used to evaluate 
evidence in this study are potential bias and objectivity. Potential for bias can result in cases 
where the material cited is authored by an individual or organisation that receives funding or 
other support from the tobacco industry; from reports commissioned by the tobacco industry; 
and/or unsubstantiated interpretation of existing information. Objectivity of resources cited 
was largely determined by whether specific sources were peer-reviewed or, in the case of 
non-academic reports, met accepted norms of fairness and accuracy [30]. Data gathered were 
initially coded by country by respective authors (Australia, RM; Canada, AM and JS; the UK, 
BH; Netherlands, JE) and all data presented in Table 1 were then assessed by all authors for 
consistency and accuracy.   
 
Results  
We identified a total of 17 campaigns mounted by TTCs across the four cases study 
countries. Table 1 provides details on which cigarette manufacturer was behind each 
campaign; the key frames deployed in each campaign; the involvement of front groups in 
promoting these; and (where provided) the evidence cited in the campaign material to support 
claims made. Table 2 summarises these findings, and provides a breakdown of the campaigns 
by source (i.e. TTC, front group); frames deployed; and channels of dissemination (i.e. 
traditional media; social media; policy statement etc) for the industryÕs message.       
 
Australia 
On 1 September 2009, AustraliaÕs Health Minister Nicola Roxon released the final report of 
the National Preventative Health Taskforce, which included recommendations for 
implementation of ÔplainÕ packaging as part of broad platform of public health initiatives. In 
April 2010, the government announced that it would introduce plain pack legislation as a 
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long-term measure aimed at people who had not taken up smoking by making it Òless 
attractive for people to experiment with tobacco in the first placeÓ [31]. The ensuing 
legislative process included stakeholder consultation, AustraliaÕs notification to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) that it intended to implement standardised packaging, and debate 
in both chambers of parliament. The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 which Òaims to 
discourage people from taking up smoking, encourage smokers to give up smoking and 
discourage relapseÓ [32] received Royal Assent on 1 December 2011, and came into effect on 
1 December 2012 [33-34]. 
The industryÕs response was immediate and robust, and ensuing legal challenges, trade 
agreement-related complaints [35] and multimillion dollar lobbying and media campaigns 
[36] reflected concerns that AustraliaÕs legislation would create an unwelcome global 
precedent. Enactment of legislation requiring text and graphic health warnings on cigarette 
packs by more than 100 countries in less than two decades would have no doubt strengthened 
industry resolve to oppose AustraliaÕs proposal [37-38].  Legal and trade challenges mounted 
by the three companies that accounted for 97.5% of cigarette sales in the country - British 
American Tobacco Australia (BATA), Imperial Tobacco and PMI Australia - as well as 
Japan Tobacco International, which had no discernible market share [39 - 42] were predicated 
on the argument that standardised packs would infringe on commercial ownership of brand 
logos and compromise intellectual property rights (IPR). PMI also warned that legal action 
could result in as much as AUS $3 billion in annual compensation to the annually [43]. The 
challenges were ultimately unsuccessful and tobacco companies ordered to pay AustraliaÕs 
legal fees [44].  
 
The industry also embarked on aggressive public relations campaigns that reiterated 
arguments used in legal action, and introduced new claims. BATA, which reportedly spent 
AUD 4.5 million [36] to fight the legislation, PMI Australia and Imperial Tobacco Australia, 
the Alliance of Australian Retailers (AAR), an industry front group, and the Institute of 
Public Affairs (IPA), a right-wing think tank with industry links [45] all mounted campaigns 
that incorporated use of print, broadcast and electronic media (see Table 1). 
The assertion that there was no evidence to support claims made for standardised packaging 
frequently framed the proposal in terms of whether it could reduce smoking rates in the short 
term. This ignored the governmentÕs consistent message that the legislation was aimed at 
long term benefits [31, 34]. BATAÕs Chief Executive demanded, for example,   Òa 100 per 
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cent guarantee that taxpayers' dollars won't be wastedÓ [46] by ineffective policy.  The Ôno 
evidenceÕ frame was summarised in BATAÕs submission to the Department of Health and 
AgeingÕs consultation on the standardised packaging bill which argued that there was Òno 
real world data to demonstrate that plain packaging of tobacco products will be effective in 
discouraging youth smoking, encouraging cessation by existing smokers, or increasing the 
salience of health warnings.Ó [47]. This message was widely disseminated by the industry 
through the media and press releases, but failed to mention that as Australia would be the first 
country to enact such legislation, no national-level evidence existed, and also ignored 
extensive findings from a large body of experimental studies [3].  
 
Not only would standardised packaging not work and potentially cost taxpayers billions of 
dollars in compensation, the industry suggested that implementation would also lead to a 
range of unintended negative consequences. BATA argued, through various channels, 
including the website plainpack.com, that the proposals would lead to a rise in illicit trade 
which, in turn, would increase consumption as smokers opted for cheaper smuggled and 
counterfeit cigarettes. The ostensible impacts on illicit trade were summarised by the 
companyÕs 2010 statement that Òthe plainer the pack, the easier it is to counterfeitÓ [48]. In 
support, the industry cited commissioned reports by accountancy firms Deloitte and KPMG 
that have subsequently been criticized for their methodologies and findings [49].  
The proposed legislation was also framed as a threat to free market values. BATA stated that 
it would Òdefend the intellectual property within our packsÓ, positioning its IPR as being 
under attack. This threat to IPR framing was also promoted by the IPA, whose 2010 report 
[50] argued that the government would have to use taxpayer dollars to deal with IPR-related 
lawsuits with tobacco companies, a claim that was picked up by the media [42]. 
 
Australian subsidiaries of TTCs also used print media, television commercials and media 
releases to caution against the growth of the nanny state, associated loss of individual 
freedom of choice, and the threat of similar regulation being imposed on alcohol and fast 
food products (see Table 1).  Imperial TobaccoÕs nanny state strategy featured a stern-looking 
woman in television commercials who stated ÒI make the rules around here, so IÕm going to 
remove all branding so every cigarette pack looks the sameÓ [51].  A subsequent voice-over 
advised audiences to contact their MP to complain about the contribution of standardised 
packs to creeping state interference in society, suggesting tobacco packaging was the first 
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step in a slippery slope to similar regulations on other products [51]. This framing was 
reiterated by PMIÕs I Deserve to be Heard website, and through cards inserted in packs of 
cigarettes, which asked smokers, ÒWhatÕs next?Ó in terms of other products that could be 
similarly regulated [52].  
 
Another approach, taken in a range of outputs, was to emphasise the threat posed by 
standardised packs to the small business. A 2011 Deloitte report commissioned by BATA 
argued that the proposed legislation would result in less efficient service at small retail outlets 
because retailers would take longer to retrieve cigarettes in standardised packs, for reasons 
not made clear. This, it was argued, would lead in increased theft, and drive customers to 
more efficient supermarkets [53]. The industry-funded AAR [3] argued that increased time 
required for retailers and customers to select cigarettes and associated errors that would be 
made in identifying brands, would increase operating costs to individual shop owners by as 
much as AUS $34,000 annually, or approximately AUS $460 million across the industry 
[54]. ÔIt wonÕt work, so why try itÕ television commercials [55] funded by the AAR featured 
forlorn-looking shopkeepers describing ways in which standardised packs would cause 
difficulties in serving customers, resulting in millions of dollars in losses.   
 
United Kingdom  
In March 2011, the UK Department of Health (DoH) published a White paper announcing 
that it would consider the introduction of standardised packaging. Following consultations 
with the Australian government during, which included requests for impact assessments on 
standardised packaging undertaken there, the DoH launched a consultation on its proposals in 
April 2012.  In July 2013, the UK government published a summary report on the 
consultation but announced that it would adopt a Ôwait and seeÕ approach, delaying the 
introduction of standardised packaging until the effects of the policy (and the outcomes of the 
various legal challenges) in Australia became clear. In November of that year, the 
government announced that it had reversed its decision and would again consider the 
introduction of standardised packaging, commissioning a review to look into the relevant 
evidence (the Chantler Review), and a month later proposed amendments to Children & 
Families Bill to introduce standardised packaging [56].  
Industry opposition to standardised packs in the UK was disseminated in three principle 
ways: company websites; political advertising campaigns in traditional and social media 
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including online video sharing platforms such as YouTube; and third party actors. This last 
category included ÔastroturfÕ organisations such as the industry funded Ôsmokers rightsÕ 
organisation FOREST (Freedom Organisation for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco) and 
associated trade bodies, but also less controversial sectors such as small retailers via, for 
example, the Tobacco Retailers Association [57]. Widespread funding of anti-standardised 
packaging campaigns by BAT through a series of third party organisations with varying 
degrees of connectedness to the tobacco manufacturer has been described elsewhere [56]. We 
found the following campaigns implemented by the tobacco industry and its allies. 
 
The Hand Off Our Packs! (HOOPs) [58] campaign organized by FOREST was the main 
industry-funded campaign against standardised packaging and acted as an umbrella for other, 
more targeted activities. A central plank of HOOPS was that standardised packaging was the 
first step in a slippery slope that would result in branding being removed from a range of 
product packaging. Launched in early 2012, the campaign utilised a dedicated website, and 
Twitter and Facebook accounts that served as a conduit for anti-standardised pack materials, 
and YouTube clips which visitors were encouraged to share via individual social media 
accounts. Less tech-savvy viewers were able to request leaflets that outlined the main 
industry arguments against standardised packs [58].  
 
The focus on individual smokersÕ rights in the YouTube clip titled ÔWelcome to Nanny 
TownÕ [59] for example, mirrored the nanny state framing seen in Australia [51]. Moreover, 
the campaign repeated claims about the apparent lack of evidence for standardised packaging 
[58], and mounted a robust defence of IPR both from the perspective of copyright owners 
(tobacco companies) and the detrimental effect their removal would have on consumers. A 
blog post entitled ÔStop Thief!Õ cited John Noble, Director of the British Brands Group who 
noted the ostensible impacts on both groups: 
Branding fulfills many significant and positive functions for both consumers and 
markets. Take it away and consumers lose out and markets become commoditised, 
with price rather than quality being the influencing factor [60]. 
 
FOREST launched a second campaign website in February 2013 as part of the wider HOOPs 
campaign. Say No to Plain Packs encouraged smokers to write to their local Members of 
Parliament (MPs) to oppose the standardised pack legislation using preformatted emails that 
contained key industry messages. The arguments in the email closely reflected those of the 
HOOPs campaign more generally, and emphasised the lack of evidence for the benefits 
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claimed for standardised packaging, the potential to encourage organised crime through the 
illicit trade, and a lack of political authority given the exclusion of the policy from the 2010 
Conservative Party manifesto [61]. 
 
Following the May 2014 publication of the Chantler report which found that standardised 
packaging could contribute to reducing both smoking prevalence and initiation [62], 
FOREST launched another campaign, No, Prime Minister, which replicated the approach of 
Say No to Plain Packs but also enabled website visitors to send pre-formatted letters to both 
their local MPs and then Prime Minister David Cameron, with additional industry arguments 
added to the range of responses [63]. Added to arguments about lack of evidence and the 
ineffectiveness of the policy, No, Prime Minister emphasised Ônanny stateÕ frames against 
standardised packs and sought to generalise the relevance of the campaign beyond tobacco, 
arguing that the proposed legislation represented a Ôslippery slopeÕ which could see other 
products such as alcohol and food being sold in standardised packaging. The policy, it was 
claimed, was little more than Ògesture politicsÓ which ÒinfantilisedÓ adult consumers [63].  
 
The UK governmentÕs decision to extend its 2012 consultation on standardised packaging 
prompted JTI to launch its own campaign. Estimated to cost around £2 million [64], it was 
aimed at both government decision makers and the general public, the campaign included 
advertisements online and in leading broadsheet newspapers that questioned the evidence 
underpinning the proposed regulation. Later broadsheet advertisements timed to coincide 
with the main political party conferences in the Autumn of 2012 focused on the allegedly 
detrimental effects of the policy in facilitating illicit trade, as well as the unintended impacts 
on small businesses such as retailers and newsagents [65]. Following complaints by the anti-
smoking non-governmental organisation, ASH UK [66], the advertising standards agency 
ruled that both these campaigns were misleading. A third wave of advertisements was 
launched in April 2013 and reproduced a letter sent by the UK Department of Health to its 
Australian counterparts in 2011 requesting evidence of the effectiveness of standardised 
packaging [65].  
 
Canada  
Canada first attempted to enact standardised packaging in 1994. Determined opposition by 
the tobacco industry based on trade, rather than health, grounds was ultimately successful in 
defeating the proposed legislation [67]. Two decades later, in May 2016, the Canadian 
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government announced plans to implement standardised packaging with a three-month open 
public consultation on the proposed regulation [68]. Tobacco companies and allied groups 
responded with campaigns using websites, posters, radio advertisements, and social media 
platforms that echoed many, but not all, of the arguments against packaging legislation used 
in other jurisdictions. 
 
At the end of the first round of public consultation, JTI-MacDonald, the third-largest tobacco 
company in Canada, launched ÒBoth Sides of the ArgumentÓ, a campaign that listed the 
ÒfactsÓ against standardised packaging [69] using websites, posters, advertisements, social 
media, and third party commissioned research. The Both Sides campaign claimed that no 
credible evidence had emerged from the Australian experience to support assertions for the 
effectiveness of standardised packs as a tobacco control measure and adopted many of the 
messages used to challenge standardisation in Australia and the UK. These included warnings 
of increases in crime and counterfeiting through the illicit trade, and threats to freedom of 
choice posed by the creeping nanny state which were disseminated through a variety of 
French and English print media. A poster campaign, for example, that featured a box of 
cigarettes containing French fries was intended to represent the inherent threat of 
standardised packaging being applied to other consumer products under a nanny state. To 
support its claims, the campaign commissioned research by the private firm Forum, and 
referenced industry funded studies from Australia [69].  
 
The Both Sides of the Argument Facebook and Twitter campaign accounts that emerged in 
July 2016 have been sporadically maintained. Several Facebook posts have encouraged the 
public to contact their MPs, echoing strategies employed in the UK and Australia to mobilise 
governments against standardised packaging in an attempt to sway provincial and federal 
legislation. Campaign strategists may have misjudged public opinion however, as comments 
posted on social media sites suggest a considerable degree of general awareness and disdain 
for the campaign, with many noting the direct tobacco industry links and funding [70].   
 
JTI-MacDonaldÕs submission to the Federal Government [71] stressed its contributions to the 
Canadian economy as a long-time, credible employer, and reiterated much of the Both Sides 
rhetoric, as well as arguments used by BATÕs consultation submission in the UK [72]. 
Economic and employment contribution claims were supported by letters in French and 
English newspapers from The Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers, Grain Millers 
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Union which emphasised the impacts of standardised packaging on illicit trade and restricting 
individual freedoms through nanny state regulations [73].   
 
Advocacy groups with links to the tobacco industry also played a key role. The National 
Coalition Against Contraband Tobacco, which receives funding from the Canadian Tobacco 
ManufacturerÕs Council, produced press releases and website content that evoked the illicit 
trade frame, including images of cigarettes and guns, and argued that illicit trade fuels 
organised crime and terrorism. The organisationÕs website maintained that Òplain packaging 
has increased contraband tobacco in other countries and will likely do the same in Canada. 
Before the government implements plain packaging, it should introduce meaningful anti-
contraband measuresÓ [74]. While there no evidence was provided of increased illicit activity 
in Òother countriesÓ, the aim of this framing was to suggest the illicit trade was the most 
pressing tobacco control issue (described as Òlow-hanging fruit for reducing smokingÓ in a 
press release) [75] and that the government was wasting its time on ineffective packaging 
regulations.  
 
The Canadian Convenience Store Association (CCSA), which has received funding from the 
tobacco industry [76], provided another third party perspective. Video clips posted on social 
media by small business owners argued that standardised packaging would adversely affect 
small businesses based on predictions of increased illicit tobacco. The CCSA also released 
media statements that questioned evidence that plain packaging was effective [77] and 
referred Òto detailed studies from AustraliaÓ on the impact in illicit trade including reports by 
Deloitte and KPMG commissioned by BATA and PMI Australia [49]. 
 
 The Netherlands 
The issue of standardised packs has been discussed in the Netherlands since the European 
Commission first announced plans to adopt a new directive in 2012 [78], and there have been 
several rounds of debate in the Dutch parliament. In 2016, a bill to introduce standardised 
packs was defeated by a majority that included all MPs of the two parties comprising the then 
coalition government, the Conservative VVD party and the Labour Party PvdA. This was not 
unexpected as the government has repeatedly spoken out against standardised pack 
legislation and had made its position clear in its submission to the EU CommissionÕs 
consultation process:  
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The Netherlands cannot support the introduction of standardised packaging because 
there is insufficient evidence as to the effectiveness of such a measure, and important 
legal questions on intellectual property rights remain. The Netherlands furthermore 
considers that there is no added value in regulating the format of the packaging 
beforehand [79]. 
 
However, during the 2016 proceedings parliament did vote in favour of an amendment 
requiring that tobacco may only be sold in simple packaging with a matte finish, and that 
distinctive colours, relief and holograms were prohibited from July 2017 [80]. The junior 
minister of health also indicated that Òif tobacco firms donÕt comply with the new rules, they 
face even tougher packaging rules and could be restricted to standard boxes which only carry 
the name of the companyÓ [81 -82]. Yet, standardised packaging remains unlikely in the near 
future. Following the March 2017 general elections a centre-right coalition was eventually 
formed in October 2017 [83] comprising parties that had not voted for standardised packs in 
2016. 
 
The two TTCs most active in the Dutch case have been BAT and Philip Morris, who both 
launched campaigns against standardised packs immediately after the EU published its 
proposal to revise the Tobacco Products Directive at the beginning of 2013 [84]. BAT 
targeted its campaign primarily at small shopkeepers and retailers who sold tobacco products, 
who were likely to be perceived by the public much more sympathetically than the tobacco 
industry to win Òthe hearts and mindsÓ of politicians [85], evoking the negative effects on 
small businesses frame.  For instance, in a two-page advertisement in the February 2013 issue 
of the magazine Tabak2day, a free monthly magazine distributed to all small tobacco sellers 
who are members of the Dutch Association of Tobacco Retailers (NSO), the Director of 
British American Tobacco Benelux warned small shopkeepers about standardised pack 
legislation and urged them to take action against the proposed legislation, ÒWake up, and letÕs 
all fight together against this useless and threatening regulations. You need to make a fist 
because this can really threaten the survival of your business [trans]Ó [85]. 
 
BAT was also able to count on support from other industrial sector allies, including the 
Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) and the Federation of 
the Dutch Food and Beverage Association (FNLI). The VNO-NCW magazine Forum 
published an article by one of its editors that invoked the nanny state frame, referring to Òan 
Orwellian 1984-societyÓ [86].  The organisation has also lobbied heavily against standardised 
packs in Brussels and The Hague [16, 87]. In 2013, BAT announced a much broader 
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campaign against standardised packs that would echo those used in Australia and the UK, and 
include creation of related websites and extensive use of the media [88]. The campaign, 
however, did not materialise, possibly as it became clear that the Dutch Government had no 
intention of introducing relevant legislation.   
 
Philip Morris (PM) Benelux hired the Dutch branch of the legal and public relations firm 
Bird&Bird [89] to develop challenges to standardised packs. The firmsÕ IPR lawyers Pors and 
Rieger-Jansen [90] published a 23-page paper in English and Dutch in May 2013 entitled 
ÒPaper regarding the legality of Standardised Packaging and other pack standardization 
measures in the NetherlandsÓ which focused mainly on IPR issues such as trademark and 
design rights, and argued that standardised packs would violate national, European and 
international law. The document also refers to other familiar arguments used in other 
countries, a lack of evidence and illicit trade, that were subsequently disseminated in PM 
Benelux press releases [91-92]. On the former, the report stated that:  
There is no credible evidence that plain packaging É will reduce overall tobacco 
consumption or prevent young people from starting to smoke. By contrast, the various 
studies conducted so far testify to the fact that plain packaging is a useless measure in 
the fight against addiction and resulting smoking related diseases [90]. 
 
 
While on illicit trade, it argued: 
Standardized É packaging makes the production of counterfeit tobacco products 
much easier and less costly. It will become simpler to reproduce packaging, cheaper 
to produce counterfeit and more difficult to identify counterfeit products [it] therefore, 
involves extra costs for border and product control and comes as a welcome incentive 
for illicit traders [90].  
 
Discussion  
Our analysis of PR campaigns indicates the apparent willingness of TTCs to strategically set 
aside commercial rivalries and to adopt a united front in response to threats to their common 
interests, reflecting findings of previous studies [93-96]. The fact that Japan Tobacco 
International was a plaintiff in the legal challenge to standardised packs in Australia [97], 
despite having no appreciable share of the countryÕs cigarette market [41], is a particularly 
relevant example of such industry pragmatism.  
 
A common feature of the campaigns was the key role played by front groups and allied 
organisations (see Table 2).  In cases such as the Canadian Convenience Store Association 
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for example, links to the tobacco industry are increasingly recognised [98]. Industry ties and 
funding of front groups are often less well-known, allowing ostensibly independent 
organisations to contribute to discourse around packaging regulation. This can also enable the 
tobacco industry to exploit public sympathy, particularly in the case of small shop owners, in 
arguing against legislation. The credibility of retailers, and other small businesses is 
particularly valuable to tobacco companies in countries with advanced tobacco control 
agendas, in which the industry is viewed with scepticism arising from litigation and academic 
analyses that have revealed a history of unethical behaviour and deception [99].  The 
campaign by the VNO-NCW in the Netherlands, for instance, seemingly added authenticity 
to industry claims that standardised packaging would have unintended consequences for 
small business owners. 
 
While similar channels (websites, media releases, paid advertisements (print and broadcast) 
and social media platforms) were used to communicate a limited range of messages across 
the campaigns, differences did exist in the approach and the emphasis of  campaigns 
analysed. Certainly, not all frames used in Australia were redeployed in the UK, Canada or 
the Netherlands, suggesting a tobacco industry strategy of adjusting key messages for 
individual markets. Using a Ôthink global, act localÕ approach, tobacco companies have 
identified local norms, needs and operating conditions, and adapted broad corporate 
guidelines to enhance local impact.  
 
The IPR frame, an ultimately unsuccessful and costly argument used in Australia was, for 
instance, not replicated in Canada, possibly due to its notable lack of return on investment in 
Australia. Canadian campaigns also linked standardised packs and illicit trade to organised 
crime and terrorism to a far greater degree than was the case in other countries. Arguably, this 
reflected concerns deriving, in part, from material published by the right-wing Macdonald-
Laurier Institute that maintained that illegal tobacco helped to fund terrorist organisations 
[100]. PR campaigns in the Netherlands did not refer to the slippery slope frame, although 
this may have been included in the campaign announced by BAT in 2013 that was ultimately 
not needed as relevant regulation was dropped from the legislative agenda. In terms of 
channels, social media featured most prominently in JTI-MacDonaldÕs Both Sides of the 
Argument campaign in Canada. As the most recent case study, it may indicate an evolving 
industry strategy that will place greater emphasis on using such platforms. Public engagement 
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on social media, however, allows for negative comments such as those posted in response to 
the Both Sides campaign, and suggests the need for closer monitoring by site administrators.  
 
Evidence used in campaign frames came from industry material, findings from commissioned 
research reports by accountancy firms such as Deloitte and KPMG, or were unsupported by 
any evidence; independent peer-reviewed research was not cited (see Table 1). Industry data 
are particularly relevant to the illicit trade frame, the most popular overall (see Table 2). 
Obtaining reliable information on illicit trade is inherently difficult given its criminal nature, 
and the tobacco industry provides data from commissioned studies which are often referenced 
in the media without recognition of tobacco industry funding [76].   
 
A notable example of the industryÕs selective use of evidence centres on its dismissal of 
claims for the effectiveness of standardised packaging. Industry messaging in Australia 
ignored findings from experimental studies published prior to enactment of the legislation 
there [101]. When used in subsequent campaigns, the Ôno evidenceÕ argument has ignored a 
growing number of studies conducted in Australia and elsewhere that demonstrate that Òplain 
packaging is delivering on its hypothetical promiseÓ [9]. Another example of questionable 
use of evidence involves the Deloitte report into the potential impacts on uniform cigarette 
packaging on Australian retailers. The industry-funded retail group the AAR used the report 
to argue that the cost of standardised packs to small shop owners would exceed AUS $450 
million annually, but this figure was later shown to have been derived from interviews with a 
total of six retailers who were asked to provide cost estimates [54].   
 
Implications for countries considering standardised packaging   
Industry campaigns have been costly. Tobacco companies in Australia spent an estimated 
AUS $9 million, while JTI spent an estimated £2 million in the UK. This, coupled with the 
recent announcement that PM Asia must pay AustraliaÕs estimated legal costs of AUS $50 
million [44] related to arbitration under the terms of the countryÕs investment treaty with 
Hong Kong, suggest that the industry is willing to invest significant resources into challenges 
against standardised packaging.  
 
Given that three of the four case study countries have adopted standardised packaging, 
industry return on investment may appear modest. Industry PR campaigns likely contributed 
to the decision not to implement the policy in the Netherlands, and delayed (but ultimately 
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failed to stop) it in the UK, and these outcomes must be understood in their specific context. 
Previous studies have demonstrated the historically strong political standing of the tobacco 
industry in the Netherlands [102], and it is reasonable to assume that the industryÕs 
relationship with the government, combined with PR campaigns targeted at public opinion, 
successfully blocked moves to institute standardised packaging. Conversely, the ability of 
Canada, the UK and Australia to pass plain packaging legislation, despite multidimensional 
well-resourced campaigns, suggests relatively greater limitations to industry influence in 
those countries.  
Yet, such investment can have value to the industry in its ability to create a ‘chilling 
effect’    that can cause governments to dilute, delay or abandon proposed regulation in 
order to avoid potential trade or investment disputes, and associated costs, that may be 
threatened by aggrieved corporate actors [15‐16, 23]. The lengthy delay in New 
Zealand’s standardised packaging legislation coming into force has been attributed, for 
example, to the threat of litigation under that country’s trade and investment 
agreements [103].  Importantly, the arbitration tribunal decision on the Hong Kong‐
Australia bilateral investment treaty was based on procedural grounds, specifically that 
PM Asia had restructured its regional operations to take advantage of the treaty [104] 
and not the complaint itself. This means that the result does not necessarily provide a 
precedent that would dissuade the company from mounting a similar challenge 
elsewhere.  
 
UruguayÕs legal battle with PMI around the countryÕs decision to introduce health warning 
labels covering 80% of the surface area of the pack in 2010 is relevant to discussion of 
regulatory chill [16, 105]. While the World BankÕs International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes in 2016 dismissed PMIÕs claims, a direct chilling effect was evident in 
the governmentÕs dilution of proposed regulations due to concerns about the costs of 
countering industry challenges [106]. Indirectly, the experience of Uruguay played a role in 
deterring four African nations, Namibia, Gabon, Togo and Uganda [16, 107], as well as Costa 
Rica and Paraguay from introducing more stringent packaging requirements for fear of facing 
similar legal challenges [108].  Despite losing its case against Uruguay, the executive director 
of Washington-based Action on Smoking and Health argued that PMI had in fact 
Òaccomplished its primary goalÓ of causing Òregulatory chill in other countries, preventing 
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tobacco legislation that would have saved livesÓ [109].     
 
As these suggest, regulatory chill has particular relevance to low and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) where legal action and trade disputes would be prohibitively expensive. 
Further, in many LMICs awareness among policymakers and the public of tobacco industry 
tactics and past practices to discourage public health measures is overshadowed by high 
profile industry corporate social responsibility initiatives that are used to gain access to 
policy-makers [110]. Findings reported above suggest that PR campaigns can contribute to 
regulatory chill by convincing government officials that the potential costs of enacting 
proposed legislation will be too high. LMIC economic realities may provide more fruitful 
contexts for PR campaigns than those presented in the high-income countries presented here, 
which, to varying extent, more rigorously restrict industry advertising and access to health 
policy-makers.  
 
Post-implementation 
Countries considering standardised pack legislation should also be alert to industry tactics 
post-implementation. Significantly, the industry has been able to frame, with some success 
[111], reductions in smoking rates as the critical measurement of the effectiveness of 
standardised packs. This disregards the fact that the long-term goals of the legislation are to 
discourage people from taking up smoking, encourage smokers to quit, and to avoid relapse 
[32]. Based on this reframing of the objectives of the legislation and how it is to be assessed, 
the industry, its allied organisations, and some media outlets have argued that standardised 
packs have been a failure [112-113]. 
 
More practical strategies have included expansion of the range of brand variants, and 
introduction of price labelling [114] in an effort to convey information previously available 
on cigarette packs.  Analysis of BATA products post-implementation found that more than 70 
brand variants appeared on the Australian market between 2012 and 2014, including 11 
variations of Dunhill and 9 versions of Winfield. Variant names have also been altered to 
include some combination of brand names, colour, flavour and a descriptive adjective to 
replace information previously available on cigarettes packs; examples include Winfield 
Optimum Crush Blue; B&H Deluxe Kings Smooth; and Dunhill Distinct Blue [115].  Less 
sophisticated tactics apparently aimed at testing government commitment to enforcement 
have included creation of container tins that closely resemble pre-regulation cigarette packs 
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[116], and selling cigarettes with a lift out inner pack devoid of mandated health warnings 
[117].     
  
Limitations  
Our study could have included other countries that have enacted or have taken steps to 
introduce standardised packaging regulation, but limitations of space precluded a more 
expanded analysis. Instead, we elected to focus on detailed analyses of tobacco industry PR 
campaigns in comparable but discrete country contexts. It is also the case that standardised 
packaging is a rapidly evolving policy field. The WTOÕs June 2018 rejection of complaints 
against AustraliaÕs legislation, and the anticipated impetus that the ruling will provide for 
other countries to enact similar regulation [118] are particularly explicit examples of the pace 
of developments, notwithstanding HondurasÕ appeal against the ruling [119]. Finally, it was 
beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively assess the impacts of tobacco industry 
campaigns using interviews with key policy actors. 
 
Conclusion 
Countries contemplating standardised packaging legislation can expect powerful opposition 
from the tobacco industry. Findings presented here indicate that a key element of anticipated 
challenges will be costly PR campaigns designed to influence public and policy-maker 
opinion through a combination of discrediting standardised packaging, claims of 
unsubstantiated risks such as increases in illicit trade, and highlighting the potential cost to 
government of fighting legal challenges to proposed legislation. The content and channels of 
dissemination of these campaigns has been similar in countries that have enacted or 
considered standardised packaging, suggesting a co-ordinated strategic approach by cigarette 
manufacturers. Tobacco control communities can learn from previous experience, and share 
best practise in challenging and countering industry arguments. The experience of the four 
countries in this study suggests that it is crucial that claims made in any future industry 
campaigns be rigorously analysed to determine the validity of evidence provided in support.  
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